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Abstract
Technical progress affects early retirement in two opposing ways. On the one hand, it
increases real wages and thus produces an incentive to postpone retirement. On the
other hand, it erodes workers’ skills, making early retirement more likely. We re-examine
the effect of technical progress on early retirement in the US. We measure technical
change during the whole working life of the individuals and find that its effect on the
probability of early retirement is non-monotonic. In particular, when technical change
is small, the erosion effect dominates, but when it is large the wage effect dominates.
These results may signal that the higher the technical change, the more willing are the
elderly to retrain, which has direct policy implications for the design of elderly training
programs.
Jel codes: J24, J26, O33
Keywords: Early retirement, Technical change, Training
1 Introduction
The labor participation rate for US individuals between 50 and 64 years old remains below
70% for males and 60% for females despite a general increase in life expectancy and health
conditions, as we report in Appendix A: Fig. 1. Hence, there is a non-negligible fraction
of individuals that exit the labor force well before they are 65. However voluntary or not,
these early retirement decisions influence the economic dependency ratio of a country,
that is, the ratio of retirees and unemployed over the employed. In the context of an aging
population, policies aimed at decreasing this phenomenon are therefore important and
call for a better understanding of the determinants of early retirement.
In this paper we reexamine the effect of technical change on early retirement. This effect
can be both positive and negative. On the one hand, technical change can erode individ-
ual skills unless workers engage in training programs. On the other hand, higher technical
levels may lead to higher individual productivity and therefore potentially to higher hourly
compensations. These effects are especially relevant for the elderly because of both the
life-cycle profile of wages and the potential age bias of technical change, as new technolo-
gies or forms of organization may affect negatively the employability of older workers. We
focus on two key aspects of the relation between early retirement and technical change.
We evaluate (i) the measure of technical change that is relevant for the obsolescence of
elderly’s abilities and (ii) the shape and size of its effect on early retirement decisions. We
show empirically that the technical change that individuals face since they enter the labor
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market weighsmore on their early retirement decisions than alternativemeasures of tech-
nical change, as we believe the erosion of skills starts from the very entry in the labor
market. Moreover, we present extensive evidence that the relation between the technical
change and the probability to retire early is non-linear.
We use US data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a survey that follows
around 37,000 adult individuals for 10 biennial waves between 1992 and 2010, with ret-
rospective information on their job history. We merge this individual data with USWorld
KLEMS aggregate data on sector TFP growth rates between 1948 and 2010. We associate
to each individual the technical change he must have faced in the sector of specializa-
tion between the reported year of entry in the job market and the year of observation.
We then check how this technical change affects the probability to retire early and com-
pare the results to those obtained with other measures of technical change. We find that
the effect of technical change on the probability of early retirement is non-monotonic.
More precisely, there exists a threshold technical change around 85% of the distribution,
below which early retirement depends positively on technical change, and above which
it depends negatively. Our findings are robust to different empirical specifications and
estimation methodologies as well as to considering various subsamples and alternative
dependent variables.
Other papers have studied the effect of technical change on early retirement. Bartel
and Sicherman (1993) (henceforth, BS) find that workers in industries with high techni-
cal change retire later than workers in industries with low technical change. They argue
that industries that experience high technical change provide on-the-job training along
the whole working life. This creates the incentives for workers to retire later in order to
collect the returns on their training. Our results are in line with this explanation, as life-
long changes in productivity in the upper end of the distribution are associated with a
decreasing probability of early retirement and changes in the lower end of the distribu-
tion are associated with an increasing probability. However, differently from BS we find
that unexpected technical shocks in the last years of the working life are less relevant
for early retirement decisions than the overall technical change that individuals experi-
ence since the entry in the labor market. Ahituv and Zeira (2011) identify the wage and
erosion effects of technical change on early retirement. They develop a general equilib-
rium model where wages equalize across sectors. Then, aggregate technical change is
responsible for a general wage increase that might reduce early retirement (wage effect),
while the sector-specific technical change is associated to the erosion effect. They use
this distinction in their empirical analysis to identify the erosion effect. More recently,
Messe et al. (2014) use French data to investigate the effect of technical change and
on-the-job training on retirement intentions. They find that technical change induces
individuals to work longer in jobs with a high probability of skill upgrading. Our findings
are in line with all these contributions and offer a general assessment of these possible
explanations.
Our work is complementary to the literature that studies the effect of a growing elderly
labor force on productivity. Sala-i-Martin (1996) proposes a model where, due to a pos-
itive externality in the average stock of human capital, it is socially optimal to encourage
retirement when the difference between the skill level of the young and that of the old is
large enough. This points to a reverse causality between early retirement and productivity.
For example, Meyer (2011) finds that firms with a younger workforce benefit from a larger
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rate of technology adoption. There is also some evidence that the age composition of the
labor force has an aggregate effect on productivity, as Feyrer (2007) and Werding (2008)
point out. Since we consider technical changes that occur during the whole working life
of individuals and, thus, before the individual early retirement decisions, our results are
robust to this issue.
The literature has highlighted other explanations for the evolution of early retirement
in the last decades.1 Some examples are changes in Social Security programs and pen-
sion plans (Crawford and Lilien (1981), Blau (1994), Rust and Phelan (1997), Blundell
et al. (2002), Coile and Gruber (2007), Vere (2011), Ferreira and dos Santos (2013), Vestad
(2013), Atalay and Barrett (2015), Euwals and Trevisan (2014)), changes in the age and skill
composition of the labor force (Blau and Goodstein (2010)), changes in workers’ health
status (McGarry (2004)), changes in leisure consumption choices (Kopecky (2011)), or
the rise of the dual-earner family and the tendency of couples to retire around the same
time (Gustman (2000), Maesta (2001), Coile (2004), Stancanelli (2012)). We include sev-
eral regressors in our econometric specification in order to account for a wide range of
these complementary explanations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our data and estimation
methodology. In Section 3 we report the estimation results and the robustness checks. In
Section 4 we extend the benchmark results to different dimensions of individual hetero-
geneity and look at the whole transition out of the labor force. Section 5 draws the final
conclusions. All figures and tables are in the Appendix.
2 Data and estimationmethodology
2.1 Data
We use US data from the HRS, which consists of a national panel survey of individuals
collected for the study of retirement and health among the elderly in the United States.
The HRS contains information about around 37,000 individuals followed in 10 biennial
waves from 1992 to 2010.2 We have information about the labor status, personal charac-
teristics, and details on the job history of the respondents. As retirement is an absorbing
state, for each wave we keep only the observations that correspond to individuals that
were working at the time of the previous wave, that is, two years prior to the interview
year.3
Each individual reports the sector of specialization as the “sector with longest tenure.”
This sector is unique by construction for each individual.4 For the vast majority
of the observations, the sector of specialization coincides with the “current sector,”
which is also reported in the survey at each wave. However, we believe that the
most relevant sector variable for the measurement of the technical change experi-
enced by individual throughout their working history is the sector of specialization.5
Our relatively large aggregation with only 13 sectors implies that the individuals that
switch sectors across waves (and therefore may report at some point a current sec-
tor that differs from the sector with longest tenure) represent only around 11% of the
observations.6
The US World KLEMS database Jorgenson et al. (2013) allows us to compute the TFP
growth that occurred in each industry from any pair of years between 1948 to 2010.7 In
this way, we have the TFP growth in, say, the “Mining and Construction” industry from
1948 to 1949 (and to 1950, 1951,. . . , 2010), from 1949 to 1950 (and to 1951, 1952,. . . , 2010),
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and so on. We then assign to each individual in a certain survey year the TFP growth that
occurred in his industry of specialization since the year he entered the job market. For
example, we assign the TFP growth that occurred in the “Retail” industry from 1955 to
1998 to an individual that entered the labor market in 1955 who declares in 1998 that his
industry is “Retail” (and is working two years prior to the survey).8
We focus on individuals who are between 50 and 64 years old at the time of the survey.
Moreover, we limit our analysis to males only. Our sample consists then of an unbalanced
panel of almost 22,000 observations for more than 6000 individuals. The panel spans 10
biennial survey years from 1992 to 2010, and individuals are distributed in 13 industries.9
Individuals can be either retired (fully or partially) or not. Appendix B: Table 1 shows the
distribution of the individuals in the sample by labor status and age group for the years
1992 (Wave 1) and 2006 (Wave 8).10 The overall population in our sample shifts through
the age groups over time, as the individuals aged 50-54 pass from 46% of the sample in
1992 to 27% of the sample in 2006, whereas the individuals aged 60-64 pass from 10% to
26%.Moreover, the aging population implies a higher percentage of retired people in 2006
(10%) than in 1992 (6%), and a correspondingly lower working population.
2.2 Estimation methodology
We want to estimate how much the probability of early retirement depends on the
technical change that individuals face during their working life. The probability model
consists of
Prob(Retiredit = 1) = f
(
α + β1bit + β2(bit)2 + γX
)
, (1)
where Prob(Retiredit = 1) is the probability of individual i to be retired in period t,
bit ≡ ln (TFP in sector of i at t) − ln
(
TFP in sector of i at entry
)
is the technical change that occurred in the sector of specialization of each individual
between the year of entry into the labor market and year t, and X are various controls for
individual, sector, and aggregate characteristics. The function f may well be non-linear
like in a logit model. We index the technical change bit by i, as two individuals in period t
that work in the same sector may differ in the amount of (sectoral) technical change they
are subject to if they differ in the year of entry into the labor market.
The use of an individual measure of technical change is crucial. First, we believe that
the obsolescence of individual skills starts from the very entry of individuals into the labor
market. Enduring into a certain industry is the product of pre-entry individual skills like
the education level and on-the-job training and learning (which we do not observe).11
Second, early retirement occurs because the working-life horizon elderly individuals face
is short enough to make on-the-job training too costly to bear compared to the potential
benefits of remaining in the labor market, net of all demographic, health, and socio-
economic characteristics. However, the focus on the last years before retirement does not
take into account the progressive depreciation of individual skills and the role that indi-
vidual work trajectories play in the decision to retire early. In other words, our measure
of working-life technical change allows us to reduce the individual unobserved hetero-
geneity that is not captured by, e.g., individual fixed effects. Third, an individual measure
generates the necessary heterogeneity in technical change across individuals that belong
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to the same sector that allows us to distinguish sectoral and time effects from the actual
technical change faced by individuals.
The individual measure of technical change poses additional challenges with respect to
an alternative, merely sector-specific measure of technical change. First, we may face an
endogeneity problem due to omitted individual characteristics that may influence both
the entry to the labor market (or the choice of the sector at entry) and the decision to
retire at a certain point. In order to capture part of these unobserved individual character-
istics, we control for a wide range of observed time-varying and time-invariant individual
characteristics in the benchmark estimation. Moreover, we include a specification with
individual fixed effects, which should control for at least those components of unob-
served individual characteristics that do not change over time. Second, part of the results
may be attributed to self-selection of workers, as for example highly skilled individuals
may opt for sectors subject to high technical change and potentially high returns. If we
suppose that the observable characteristics included in the benchmark specification are
correlated with the self-selection, then we can look at subsamples for unique values of
these observable characteristics. If estimates vary considerably across subsamples, then
we have a signal of self-selection at work, or at least of a dimension of self-selection
that is relevant for our exercise. If we suppose that unobserved individual character-
istics may play a role in the self-selection of workers, then including individual fixed
effects partially accommodates for this issue, as any time-invariant individual character-
istics that contribute to the choice of entry in a specific year and in a specific sector are
captured by the individual fixed effects. If instead we suppose that observed character-
istics included in the benchmark specification are not correlated with the self-selection,
then we can consider a specification with random effects. Lastly, we control for selec-
tion at exit with a survival model, which also explicitly accommodates for the structure
of our dependent variable. Our benchmark estimates are robust to all these concerns.
The discussion of these issues paves the way for several extensions that we leave to future
research.
As the probability model in (1) relies on individual data that is merged with aggregate
data, the errors that originate from its estimation may well be correlated across obser-
vations that belong to the same sector-year pair.12 Hence, we cluster the errors at the
sector-year level.
We measure the probability of early retirement with the dummy variable “Retiredit ,”
which takes the value 1 if an individual i at time t reports to be either fully or partially
retired and the value 0 if the individual is either working full-time, working part-time, or
unemployed. The variable bit represents the TFP growth that occurs in the sector where
the individual is specialized between the year when the individual enters the labor mar-
ket and the year of the survey. This measure of technical change ranges from 8% (1st
percentile) to +364% (99th percentile), with a mean of 188%. By construction, bit varies
across sectors of specialization, years of the waves, and years of entry. In order to clarify
the source of the variation, we report the distribution of bit across sectors in Appendix A:
Fig. 2, across waves in Appendix A:Fig. 3, and across years of entry in Appendix A: Fig. 4.
All dimensions of variation present a reasonable amount of heterogeneity across individ-
uals, with the exception of the individuals that enter the labor market from 1981 onwards
(less than 5% of the observations).13 The individuals that enter later in the sample are
mostly the youngest. However, Appendix A: Fig. 5 shows that within each birth cohort
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there is sufficient variation. Hence, we conclude that our measure of technical change
presents a rich variability across several dimensions. As the sources of variation in our
measure of technical change are the sector-specific TFP processes, the years of entry into
the labor force, and the years of waves, identification is achieved as long as at least one of
these dimensions varies across observations.
The controls include personal characteristics such as age, race, education, sector
experience (i.e., the span of time between year t and the year of entry), region of res-
idence, health status, wealth level, marital status and working status of the spouse,
presence of privately- or government-provided health insurance, access to a pension plan
or current pension income, and occupation, cohort, and sector dummies. We include
also the level of unemployment rate in the year of the survey to control for business
cycle-related, time-varying aggregate effects. Appendix B: Table 2 reports the summary
statistics of all the variables, together with other variables used in the robustness exercises
later.
Our benchmark regressions consist of a pooled logit model and a linear probability
model. The almost perfect coincidence between the marginal effects of the logit model
and the linear probability model informs us about the structure of the function f of the
probability model (1), which appears to be linear in the data. We compare the bench-
mark specification of the linear probability model with a panel linear probability model
with random effects, a panel linear probability model with fixed effects, and the marginal
effects of a survival model. Results are consistent across all estimations. Moreover, we
perform several robustness checks. First, we consider alternative measures of technical
change. Second, we control for the endogeneity of the entry decision. Third, we explore
the structure of the relation between technical change and early retirement. In particular,
we allow for a lower order polynomial (that is, a linear relation) and a higher order poly-
nomial. Fourth, we check the robustness of the results to subsamples like the pre-crisis
period. Fifth, we control for the effect of bridge jobs by eliminating the individuals that
report a change in the sector of specialization or the occupation. Sixth, we collect a series
of additional robustness checks.
Using the benchmark specification, we detail several potential dimensions of hetero-
geneity. Hence, we look at the relationship between early retirement and technical change
across education levels, occupations, sectors, marital statuses, cohorts, age groups,
genders, periods of permanence in the labor force, and training experiences. These
exercises serve the purpose of both illustrating the heterogeneous effects within sub-
samples of the data and corroborating the identification of the key coefficients in the
benchmark specification. For example, the sector experience is correlated by construc-
tion with our measure of technical change and may affect the early retirement decision
directly through higher pension entitlements, wage profiles, and so on. Hence, it is
important to see how our key coefficients describe the same nonlinear relationship
between technical change and early retirement for both high and low levels of sector
experience.
Lastly, we look at the effect of technical change on the whole transition from working
full-time to working part-time, to unemployment, and eventually to early retirement. In
this way, we show that the effects of technical change on the labor status relate mainly to
the decision to retire early and have only marginal effects on the transition to part-time
work and unemployment.
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3 Empirical results
3.1 Main estimations
We present the main regressions in Appendix B: Table 3. Column (1) shows the results
from a pooled logit, column (2) from an OLS, column (3) from a panel OLS with random
effects, column (4) from a panel OLS with fixed effects, and column (5) from a survival
model (a pooled complementary log-log model).
The benchmark specification in columns (1) and (2) yields a statistically significant
dependence between technical change and early retirement. The relation appears non-
monotonic, as the negative sign on the square of technical change implies a downward
inversion for high-enough levels of technical change. In order to gauge the magnitude of
this non-linearity, we plot the predicted probability of early retirement for different levels
of technical change in Appendix A: Fig. 6. We compute the prediction using the pooled
logit of column (1) for the case of a white single male with 30 years of experience, a pen-
sion, and no health insurance, while holding the rest of the variables at their mean. The
probability of early retirement for example almost doubles from 3% to 6% if the technical
progress experienced throughout the working life consists of a 150% change instead of a
50% change. The hump-shaped relation implies that the probability of early retirement
reaches a maximum 7.7% in correspondence of a 260% technical change and decreases
back to around 6% for the most extreme values of technical change.14
The rest of covariates affect early retirement in the same way as previously found in the
literature and have straight-forward intuitions. Individuals delay the decision on retire-
ment if the spouse is still working, in line with Baker and Benjamin (1999), Blau (1998),
and Coile (2004), among others. In general, the wealthier the individual, the higher the
likelihood of retirement (see Brown et al. (2010)). A higher individual wealth guaran-
tees a higher buffer to face any idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks that may follow the
retirement decision. A government health insurance plan is associated with a higher
probability of early retirement, while an employer health insurance seems to have no
statistical significant effects (if anything, the effect is negative in column (1)).15 How-
ever, specifications that control for unobserved individual characteristics like in column
(3) and column (4) stress the incentives towards a longer permanence in the labor force
that an employer-provided health insurance conveys. Having a pension plan or already
perceiving a pension income seems to reduce the incentives to abandon the labor force.
Blundell et al. (2002) highlight how the opportunity cost of working is higher in this case,
as having a pension may reduce the probability of early retirement if its benefits increase
with tenure. The pension schemes may create additional returns to current wage income
vis-à-vis future pension benefits. Moreover, the retirement decision yields a marginally
lower increase in pension benefits when the individual has already started perceiving
them.
Our results confirm the important role that the health status plays in the retire-
ment decision, as in French (2005) and Ferreira and dos Santos (2013), among others.
An increasingly bad health status makes individuals more likely to retire early. More-
over, there seems to be a relevant non-linearity in this relationship. Health statuses vary
through 5 levels, from excellent to very good, to good, to fair, and eventually to poor.
Passing from a very good to a good health status increases the probability of early retire-
ment by around one percentage point, whereas passing from a good to a fair health status
increases the probability of early retirement by 5 percentage points. Passing from a fair to
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a poor health status instead increases the probability of early retirement by more than 20
percentage points.16
We do not report race, foreign-born, geographical, education, occupation, age, cohort,
sector, and sector experience dummies for the sake of brevity. Hispanic individuals tend
to retire later than other reported races (Black/African American and White/Caucasian).
The same happens to individuals born abroad and individuals resident in the South as
opposed to resident in the North-East. The education level does not seem to have an
impact on the early retirement decision, although high-school graduates are somewhat
more likely to retire early. Managers and professionals seem to retire early just as much
as clerks, less than those occupied in services, mechanics, constructors, and operators,
and more than those occupied in farming, forestry, fishing, and armed forces. Not sur-
prisingly, the older the individual, the more likely he is to retire early. The effect is again
non-linear. The probability increases by 10 percentage points from 50 to 60 years old,
and by a further 40 percentage points from 60 to 64. There does not seem to be any
cohort effect, except for a slightly smaller probability (2 percentage points) for those born
in the 5 years immediately after the World War (1946–1950). Also differences across
sectors are mild. The individuals most likely to retire early are those working in the pub-
lic administration (their probability is more than 11 percentage points higher than that
of the individuals who are the least likely to retire early, that is, those in the Business
and Repair industry), followed by Manufacturing and Transportation (between 9 and 7
percentage points higher), and the rest of the sectors (with no statistically significant dif-
ferences). Sector experience has a negative effect on early retirement. This may capture
either learning-by-doing, as individuals that accumulate more years of experience in the
same sector tend to resist better the obsolescence of their skills, or a selection effect, as
individuals that remain longer in the labor market are those more likely to keep work-
ing. In this respect, it is informative that the results do not change in the survival model
of column (5), which partially controls for the selection at exit. Hence, we conclude that
learning-by-doing is relevant for the early retirement decision.
The estimates from the model with random effects in column (3) are similar to the
benchmark model’s. The signs do not change, while the magnitudes become somewhat
bigger. Hence, we conclude that those components of unobserved individual characteris-
tics that are not correlated with the rest of the covariates do not play an important role.
An exception is the employer-provided health insurance, whose coefficient becomes sta-
tistically significant and negative in sign. This may reflect the contractual terms of the
employer’s insurance that vary across employer-employee matches and are specific to the
matches themselves rather than observable individual characteristics. The fixed-effects
regression in column (4) delivers the strongest deviation from the benchmark, although
still only in terms of coefficients’ magnitude. The individual dummies displace all time-
invariant race, foreign-born, education, occupation, cohort, and sector dummies. There
is a total of 6,146 groups in the regression, with observations per group varying from 1
to 8 with a mean of 3.6. Almost 70% of the overall variance is due to the individual fixed
effects, and we can safely reject the hypothesis that they are all jointly equal to zero. The
coefficients on the technical change and its square do not change sign nor level of sta-
tistical significance, but they do change in magnitude. As a consequence, the non-linear
relation predicted by the fixed-effects estimation becomes monotonic for all actual val-
ues of technical change, as the hump of the relation occurs for values of technical change
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that are double than the maximal observed value. This change in magnitude may be
due to the fact that the year of entry does not change over time and is an important
determinant of the individual TFP growth that we use as a measure of technical change.
Hence, the individual fixed effects are likely to be correlated with our measure of techni-
cal change andmay therefore bias the estimates of our key coefficient. The survival model
in column (5) consists of a complementary log-log regression and confirms the scenario
of the benchmark model. The zero outcomes are 19,228, while the nonzero 2628, and the
final pseudolikelihood level and Wald test fall in the ballpark of column (1)’s.
We can rationalize the non-monotonic relation between early retirement and technical
change with the two countervailing effects of technical change. Ahituv and Zeira (2011)
propose to label an increase in the early retirement probability as an erosion effect. This
effect represents the larger difficulty that individuals subject to higher technical innova-
tion in the workplace face in order to remain in the labor market. A decrease in the early
retirement probability is instead a wage effect, as a higher technical content increases the
hourly productivity of workers and may thus induce an increase in the wage, which would
in turn create further incentives for workers to remain in the labor force. Depending on
the balance between the countervailing effects of erosion and wage developments, the
effect of technical change on the probability to retire early is positive or negative. Previous
studies are however quite silent on the shape that such a dependence may take, consid-
ering instead only the eventual sign of the relation. Our results suggest that the erosion
effect is larger than the wage effect for most levels of technical change, except for high
levels for which the wage effect dominates. Although the identification of the mechanism
behind these results goes beyond the scope of this paper, let us briefly discuss a series
of possible interpretations. First, Burlon and Vilalta-Buf í (2014) propose a model where
the inverse-U shape emerges when the retraining cost is increasing and strongly concave
with respect to technical change. Second, life-long learning seems important to reduce
the cost of training. Hence, sectors with larger technical changes may also be those that
offer life-long training to their workers, as in Bartel and Sicherman (1993) andMesse et al.
(2014). Third, the magnitude of the observed technical change may proxy the underlying
nature of different technological or organizational innovations. For instance, the intro-
duction of computers and ICT technology could be the driver of large technical change
as opposed to other more sector-specific innovations that might drive smaller technical
changes. If the incentives to train are larger for more general-purpose technologies, this
could explain the higher prevalence of training in sectors with large technical change and
the inverse-U shape we find.
3.2 Robustness checks
We perform several robustness checks. In Appendix B: Table 4 we estimate the bench-
mark logit model substituting our working-life measure of TFP growth with alternative
measures. In Appendix B: Table 5 we control for the potential endogeneity of our measure
of technical change. In Appendix B: Table 6 we approximate the relation between techni-
cal change and early retirement with higher and lower order polynomials. In Appendix B:
Table 7 we leave aside specific sections of the data that may drive the results. In Appendix
B: Table 8 we restrict the estimation to individuals that do not change sector or occupa-
tion, so as to isolate the role of bridge jobs. Lastly, in Appendix B: Tables 9 and 10 we
collect the rest of the robustness checks.
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The use of alternative measures of technical change does not change the overall mes-
sage. However, some alternatives seem to have a less clear impact on the decision to retire
early. Column (2) of Appendix B: Table 4 reports the coefficients associated with the TFP
change (and its square) that occurs 5 years prior to the survey year. This measure of tech-
nical change stresses the erosion of individual skills that may occur in the last years of
working lives. More recent shocks may be more likely to be the sole drivers of retirement
decisions. Bartel and Sicherman (1993) suggest that earlier shocks are potentially coun-
teracted by training practices, while later shocks appear as surprises to the skill set of
individuals. Column (2) suggests that the 5-years technical change does not have a statis-
tically significant effect on the probability to retire early. The signs are the same as in the
benchmark case that we report in column (1), although the coefficients are one order of
magnitude larger due to the inherently smaller shocks of column (2). Hence, we conclude
that technical changes that may occur in the last years are indeed relevant for the retire-
ment decision but are not the only drivers. We do not report the same exercise with both
measures of technical change in the same specification, although it yields a significant
coefficient for our measure and a not significant coefficient for the alternative.17
In column (3) of Appendix B: Table 4 we divide our measure of technical change by the
number of years that individuals spend in the labor force, that is, the sector experience.
This variable proxies the mean technical change that each individual faces from his entry
into the labor market to the time of the survey. This measure of technical change filters
out the component of our measure of technical change that depends on the sector experi-
ence and is therefore likely to reflect more the intersectoral differences in TFP processes.
The key coefficients have the same sign and similar statistical significance, and the larger
magnitudes simply reflect the smaller average values of the independent variable. The
predicted probability of early retirement reaches a maximum for a mean TFP growth of
around 7.3%, with around 10.4% of the observations lying on the right side of this value,
similarly to what happens in the benchmark case.
We can try to disentangle the contemporaneous effects of technical change on both
the erosion of skills and the wage of individuals as previously done in the literature. For
example, Ahituv and Zeira (2011) propose a way to disentangle these effects by distin-
guishing between the sector-specific component of technical change, which affects the
erosion of skills alone and does not have a sufficient general-equilibrium impact to affect
wages, and the aggregate component of technical change which instead affects both the
individuals skills and the wages. We report in column (4) of Appendix B: Table 4 a similar
exercise, where we associate to each individual in each wave both the aggregate and the
sector-specific TFP growth that he faces since his entry in the labormarket.We isolate the
sector-specific component by subtracting to our measure of TFP growth the correspond-
ing aggregate TFP growth that we derive from the KLEMS data. However, the aggregate
measure is by construction more correlated with sector experience than our benchmark
measure, as the only sources of variation left in the aggregatemeasure are the year of entry
in the labor market and the year of the wave. Hence, we divide our sector-specific and
aggregate measures by the sector experience as in column (3). Our results are consistent
with the predictions of Ahituv and Zeira (2011), as the sector-specific technical change
seems to have only a linear, positive erosion effect, while the aggregate technical change
affects both the erosion of skills and the wage dynamics, thus causing a non-monotonicity
in the relation that is similar to our benchmark result.
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Column (5) of Appendix B: Table 4 substitutes our measure of technical change based
on TFP growth with an alternative measure based on changes in the value added per
worker. We use Bureau of Economic Analysis’ data with NAICS-coded industries.18 We
match individual and aggregate data in the same way as in the benchmark exercise. The
value added per worker may better reflect potential developments in the individual wage
since it refers more closely to the individual productivity of workers. The results suggest a
milder dependence of early retirement from developments in the value added per worker
than in the TFP, with a proportional reduction in the curvature of the relation. We reach
the maximal probability of early retirement around the same growth rate of 260% as in the
case of TFP growth. However, the predicted probability that results from such a technical
change is around 4 percentage points lower than in the case of TFP changes, other things
equal. This is in line with a relevant role for wage effects, as a measure that arguably is a
more accurate proxy of individual wages than TFP yields a lower effect of the same growth
rate on the probability to retire early. Hence, we conclude that alternative measures of
technical change permit the exploration of different dimensions of the same dependence
and help a more robust interpretation of the benchmark results.19
We cannot directly measure the wage effect, as we miss the correct counterfactual wage
that retired individuals would enjoy if they remained in the labor market. However, we
can still look at how the hourly wage of workers depends on our measure of technical
change. Appendix A: Fig. 7 reports the (unconditional) fractional-polynomial prediction
of the hourly wage for the individuals that work at the time of the survey as a function
of our measure of technical change. The wage depends positively on technical change
and the noise associated to this dependence increases for high-enough levels of technical
change, where the average equilibrium wage may even decrease as a result of selection
at exit, pension schemes, bargained-again labor contracts, and so on. The interpretation
for which the wage effect is likely to dominate for high enough levels of technical change
squares well with this evidence.
We address the endogeneity of the entry decision in Appendix B: Table 5. The decision
to enter the labor market in a certain year may be driven by an unobserved individ-
ual characteristic that drives also the exit decision, thus inducing a spurious correlation
between our measure of technical change and early retirement. Moreover, the individual
fixed effects of the regression in column (4) of Appendix B: Table 3 are correlated by con-
struction with the year of entry of individuals, which may induce a bias in the estimate of
the effect of technical change on early retirement. Hence, we reduce the endogeneity of
the entry decision by substituting our measure of technical change with two alternatives.
In column (2) we report the regression with individual fixed effects where the techni-
cal change is measured from the year in which individuals have finished their education.
We derive this year by adding to the birth year the reported years of education and the
6 years that precede the start of compulsory education. In column (3) we drop also the
endogeneity of the education decision and simplymeasure technical change since individ-
uals are 21 years old. However arbitrary, this measure is homogeneous across individuals
that belong to the same cohort. Thus, the individual fixed effects are less correlated with
technical change. The correlation between the individual dummies and the rest of the
covariates drops by 10 percentage points from the benchmark fixed-effects regression to
the regression in column (2) and by one additional percentage point to the regression in
column (3). The resulting coefficients portray an even steeper relation between technical
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change and early retirement than in the benchmark fixed-effects regression. The relation
is monotonic (for the realized values of our measure of technical change) and concave as
in column (1), while the coefficients on the rest of the covariates remain unaltered.
In Appendix B: Table 6 we explore the shape of the relation between technical change
and early retirement. In particular, we check whether our results are robust to the order of
the polynomial that we use to approximate the dependence. The linear approximation of
column (2) yields a positive and statistically significant coefficient associated to technical
change. The linear predicted probability crosses exactly the non-linear prediction of the
benchmark regression, while the rest of the covariates is virtually the same up to the third
digit. In column (3) the polynomial of order 3 yields a coefficient for the cube of the
technical change which is not statistically significant. Moreover, the magnitude of the
three key coefficients implies a prediction that basically coincides with the prediction of
the benchmark quadratic approximation within the actual support of technical changes.
Hence, the quadratic term of benchmark regression alone seems to capture most of the
non-linearity in the relation.
In Appendix B: Table 7 we explore relevant subsamples of the data. In particular, in
column (2) we consider only positive TFP shocks so as to rule out the possibility that our
results are driven by a few negative shocks. The estimates are close to the benchmark
case. In column (3) we consider only the years before the Great Recession, that is, we
exclude from the sample the surveys conducted in 2008 and 2010. These are years of
deep economic turmoil, and individuals’ retirement decisionsmight be driven by different
factors, at least beyond what our proxy for the business cycle (the unemployment rate)
might capture. The coefficient that changes the most is the one associated with the net
wealth.We read this as a confirmation of how a higher wealthmay work as a buffer against
the adverse crisis shocks, as individuals with a higher wealth are more likely to drop out
of the labor force after the crisis (when wage prospects and work conditions deteriorate)
than before the crisis.
We restrict the estimation to those individuals that do not report any change of
current sector or occupation across all surveys in Appendix B: Table 8. In this way,
we identify those individuals that do not respond to technical change with a profes-
sional conversion to a different sector or occupation. In other words, we control for the
use of so-called bridge jobs by elderly individuals that are close to the retirement age,
which is one potential dimension of selection at exit. The estimates reveal a stronger
effect of technical change on these individuals. Elderly individuals with a smaller set
of alternatives to early retirement are more likely to retire early as a consequence of
a technical change. The magnitude of the key coefficients are between almost two
and three times the benchmark’s, while the rest of the covariates are not relevantly
different.
We gather the rest of the robustness checks in Appendix B: Tables 9 and 10. In col-
umn (2) of Appendix B: Table 9 we employ the benchmark specification using the survey
weights of the 1992 wave.We omit for the sake of brevity the rest of the sensitivity analyses
using the survey weights from the other waves as well as wave-by-wave regressions with
the corresponding survey weights. The benchmark results are robust to all these varia-
tions. The only slight difference is in health status’ coefficients, as a poor health status
predicts a probability of early retirement that is 3 percentage points higher than in the
benchmark regression. In column (3) in Appendix B: Table 9 we consider a winsorized
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version of our measure of technical change. We winsorize the distribution of individual
TFP growths within each wave at the 1-st and 99-th percentiles. The results do not change
even if we consider lower thresholds for the winsorization like 5-th and 95-th percentiles.
In column (2) of Appendix B: Table 10 we substitute the cohort dummies of the bench-
mark specification (which imply one dummy every 5 birth years from 1927 to 1960) with
birth-year dummies, with no consequence on the results. Also a larger aggregation (not
reported) with dummies every 10 birth years does not yield different results. In column (3)
of Appendix B: Table 10 we consider the one-year lag of all time-varying covariates, that
is, marital and health status, insurance and pension endowment, residence, and sector
experience. No significant change occurs in the key coefficients.
4 Extensions
4.1 Dimensions of heterogeneity
We explore different dimensions of heterogeneity across individuals. The follow-
ing exercises serve two purposes. On the one hand, they illustrate several poten-
tial channels of heterogeneity across individuals that the literature finds relevant. On
the other hand, the detail by different characteristics adds to the robustness of the
results and sheds light on the key issues that our econometric set-up and our data
pose. Appendix B: Table 11 looks at differences across education levels, Appendix
B: Table 12 across occupations, Appendix B: Table 13 across sectors, Appendix B:
Table 14 across marital statuses, Appendix B: Table 15 across cohorts, Appendix
B: Table 16 across age groups, Appendix B: Table 17 across genders, Appendix B:
Table 18 across levels of sector experience, and Appendix B: Table 19 across training
experiences.
Appendix B: Table 11 splits the benchmark sample between individuals that have a
college degree and individuals that do not have a college degree. In the benchmark
logit regression, the coefficients associated with the dummies for the education levels
are not statistically significant in general. However, the education level may have impli-
cations for our regressors rather than for our dependent variable. Our key regressors
representing technical change are similar across the two subsamples. However, in the
college sample government-provided health insurance, though still relevant, impacts the
probability of early retirement by less than half the magnitude of the coefficient in the
non-college sample. In the case of the wealth level, the impact even loses statistical sig-
nificance. Also the impact of the health status is slightly different. College graduates
seem to react early on to signs of declining health, as the coefficients of the dum-
mies for less-than-excellent health statuses are higher in magnitude than for non-college
graduates. However, the response to a poor health status is stronger in the sample of
non-college graduates. We omit the sensitivity analyses on all the rest of subsamples by
education level.
The second dimension of heterogeneity we explore is the profession. We separate indi-
viduals that report to be managers and specialized professionals from the rest of the
sample in Appendix B: Table 12. If anything, we would expect managers and specialized
professionals more likely to engage in training practices later in life, which would in turn
help them to remain in the labor force even in presence of large technical changes in
their sector of specialization. The unconditional summary statistics indicate that the per-
centage of managers and specialized professionals that retire early is around 4 percentage
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points lower than the percentage in other occupations, even though they are subject to
technical changes that are on average 10 percentage points higher. There must be a higher
wage effect for managers and specialized professionals. However, we do not find relevant
differences across the two subsamples for our key coefficients. Hence, we deduce that the
non-linear relation between early retirement and technical change captures sufficiently
well the balance between erosion and wage effects within these subsamples. The rest of
the covariates vary in a similar way as in the case of the subsamples by education level.
We do not report more detailed splits across other occupations as they deliver a similar
overall message.
In Appendix B: Table 13 we analyze the differences across sectors. As we derive our
measure of technical change from both sector-specific and individual data, looking within
each sector means that the variation of our measure is due exclusively to individual
characteristics, that is, the timing of entry and exit from the labor market. We choose
to isolate the manufacturing sector (durables and non-durables), the professional and
related services sector, and the public administration sector from the rest. Professional
and related services and public administration are two sectors that were subject to large
technical change, as Appendix A: Fig. 2 shows. Manufacturing represents a large sec-
tor that comprises more than one fourth of the overall observations. We find that the
relationship between technical change and early retirement is stronger in manufactur-
ing and public administration. However, the level of technical change that maximizes
the probability to retire early is around 260% like in the benchmark. The difference is
that for that level of technical change an individual in the manufacturing sector or in
the public administration is more than 10 percentage points more likely to retire early
than an individual in a generic sector, other things equal. Individuals in the professional
and related services are not only less prone to retire early in general but also less reac-
tive to technical change, health concerns, marital status, and any of the other covariates.
The general message is that the non-linear structure of the relation between early retire-
ment and technical change holds even within each sector, although with slightly different
magnitudes.
Appendix B: Table 14 suggests that unmarried individuals are more responsive to tech-
nical change than married individuals, perhaps because of joint retirement decisions that
mitigate potential retirement incentives of the elderly. Appendix B: Table 15 looks at a
sample split by cohort. We look at the benchmark specification depending on the year
of birth and separate individuals born before World War II (up to 1939) from individu-
als born after World War II (after 1939). The coefficients are similar to the benchmark’s,
and the predicted probabilities across subsamples as a function of technical change coin-
cide almost perfectly. We draw the same picture from Appendix B: Table 16, where we
detail the relationship by age group. We do not find relevant differences in statistical sig-
nificance and sign of the coefficients. The increasing magnitude of the effect of technical
change for older age groups partly reflects the higher unconditional mean of the depen-
dent variable, which we document in Appendix B: Table 1, but also a potential age bias of
technical change. The rest of the covariates increases inmagnitude as well, which suggests
a higher relevance of the first interpretation.
Appendix B: Table 17 presents the results for the female sample. We do not con-
sider females in the benchmark exercise in order to be consistent with the rest of the
literature. Moreover, there is an important selection issue as the female labor force
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participation increases relevantly in the same period over which we compute our mea-
sure of technical change, so the results for the female sample are likely to be less robust
to endogeneity concerns. The relation between technical change and early retirement
is convex rather than concave for females, although for the actual values of our mea-
sure of technical change, the relation is simply positive and monotonic. Females seem
to be seven times more responsive to their marital status than males. The lower female
labor force participation coupled with the assortative matching in the marriage mar-
ket reduces the outside options for elderly married women. Elderly female workers are
more likely to slide into early retirement to follow their partners’ retirement choices,
an interpretation that is confirmed by the unchanged coefficient on the working status
of the partner. If we look at the (unconditional) retirement probability by gender and
by marital status, we find that married males are less likely to retire early than unmar-
ried males, while married females are more likely retire early than unmarried females.
Females are also four times more responsive to their wealth and twice more responsive
to having a pension scheme or receiving a pension income than males. We interpret the
reaction to marital status, wealth, and pension as evidence of relatively higher financial
constraints and dependence faced by female individuals. Health is another important
determinant for females’ retirement choices in terms of both privately-provided health
insurance and actual health status. The health status has an even more non-linear effect
than in the males’ sample. A female individual in poor health is almost 39 percentage
points more likely to retire early than a female with excellent health, whereas a male
in poor health was only 28 percentage points more likely than a male with an excellent
health.
In Appendix B: Table 18 we explore the role of sector experience. Our measure of
technical change is correlated by construction with the span of time that individuals
pass in the labor force. However, its inclusion is important as it may affect the early
retirement decision through other channels such as pension entitlements, resilience
to further technology and organizational shocks, and so on. Hence, it is important to
check whether our benchmark estimates report a nonlinear relation between techni-
cal change and early retirement even when we control for a nonlinear effect of sector
experience. In column (2) we show that including dummies for the quartiles of the
sector experience distribution instead of the yearly measure does not substantially alter
the results. The predicted marginal effect is only slightly flatter than the benchmark
case. In this case the correlation between our measure of technical change and the
sector experience is arguably lower. The estimates of the dummies show a nonlin-
ear, concave relationship between sector experience and early retirement. In column
(3) and column (4) we use the specification of column (2) and look at the hetero-
geneous effects of technical change for levels of sector experience that are either
higher or lower than the median value. By construction, only one dummy for the
sector experience quartiles is left in each subsample. The overall concave effect is
maintained, with a flatter response of early retirement for lower levels of technical
change.
In Appendix B: Table 19 we check for the different reaction that individuals reporting
more than 100 h of training in their work life might have.20 Consistently with the previ-
ous literature, we find that training practices help individuals to counteract the erosion
effect of technical change. Thus, the effect of technical change on the early retirement
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of individuals that do engage in training is nil, which may be the net result of both the
erosion and the wage effects.21
The exercises with education, professions, sectors, and marital status look at relevant
ways to divide the sample and show us that potential self-selection concerns on observ-
ables are less severe than one may expect from our data structure. The key coefficients on
technical change are robust to differentiation across observable characteristics that are
potential dimensions of heterogeneous early retirement behavior. Whatever the unob-
servable characteristics that may drive the decision to reach a certain education level, to
select a certain profession, or to specialize in a certain sector, they do not seem to affect
the way in which the probability of early retirement depends on technical change. The
exercises with cohorts, age groups, and genders show us instead that even a split based
on an observable exogenous characteristic such as the year of birth does not relevantly
alter the estimates. Important differences arise only when we look at the effect of train-
ing, which is structurally connected to the erosion that the technical change can cause
on the ability of individuals to remain in the labor market. Receiving training makes early
retirement not respond to technical change.
4.2 The process of transition out of the labor force
Technical change may have effects not only on the decision to retire early but also on
the likelihood to maintain a full-time job. This may be especially true for the elderly, as
the short work-life span left before retirement reduces the incentives of both workers and
firms to invest in the maintenance of individual skills and tends to reduce the involvement
of the elderly in the production process. In general, the transition of older individuals into
retirement is not necessarily an abrupt shift from a full-time job to full retirement but
may rather pass through a reduction in working hours, a different occupation or job, or
unemployment.22
We look at the transition of individuals in our sample from working full-time to work-
ing part-time, to unemployment, and eventually to retirement. In Appendix B: Table 20
we keep the benchmark specification and change dependent variables. In column (1) we
report the benchmark estimation with the dummy “Retired” as the dependent variable.
In column (2) we look at the probability of being either retired or unemployed. In col-
umn (3) we extend further the definition of the dependent variable to include also the
part-time workers. We do not observe significant changes of the key estimates across
specifications, net of the level effect of a larger share of population reporting “1” as the
value of the dependent variable. Appendix A: Fig. 8 reports the predicted probabilities of
the estimations in column (1), column (2), and column (3) of Appendix B: Table 20 (the
first prediction is the benchmark that we report also in Appendix A: Fig. 6 together with
the relative confidence intervals). The shape of the relation coincides across dependent
variables, and the function simply consists of an upward level effect. Hence, the technical
change eminently affects the retirement decision rather than intermediate steps towards
the exit from the labor force, like part-time work or unemployment. The health status
seems to be another specific determinant of early retirement rather than a determinant
of labor statuses in general. The coefficients associated to the rest of the covariates sug-
gest that working part-time and unemployment depend more than early retirement on
the marital status, the nature of health insurance and pension schemes, or the wealth
level.23
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5 Conclusions
We explore the role of technical change on early retirement decisions. We propose a mea-
sure of technical change that takes into account the whole working life of individuals,
as we believe that the obsolescence of individual skills begins from the very entry
into the labor force and that relevant, potentially unobserved elderly characteristics
depend on their entire work-life history. We allow the shape of the relation between
technical change and early retirement to be non-linear so as to accommodate for a
wide range of possible explanations. We control for observed and unobserved indi-
vidual characteristics and provide a large swath of robustness checks. Moreover, we
present a series of exercises that analyzes several dimension of potential heterogeneity
across individuals that belong to different education levels, occupations, sectors, mari-
tal statuses, cohorts, age groups, and training experiences. Lastly, we present evidence
on how the technical change specifically affects the decision to leave the labor force
by the elderly rather than intermediate labor statuses like working part-time or being
unemployed.
Our contribution departs from the previous literature as we consider the technical
change that each individual is subject to during his whole working life. Our results sug-
gest that the erosion effect of technical change on individual skills is a pervasive feature
of the early retirement decision. However, the contemporaneous effect on wages is a rel-
evant component as well, especially for large enough technical changes. This leads to a
non-monotonic relation between early retirement and technical change, with a downward
tilt for high technical changes. Alternative measures that stress the role of wage effects
confirm this interpretation.
Further research should use more extensive data to explore the mechanisms driving
these results. A series of potential candidates includes the shape of retraining costs, the
consequences of on-the-job training and life-long learning, and the heterogeneous effects
of inherently different technological innovations. Structural modeling may help to bet-
ter distinguish the contributions of the different channels and to encompass general
equilibrium effects.
In the context of an aging society, policies may aim at delaying retirement and stim-
ulate the participation of the elderly to the labor force. For example, an increase in
workers’ working horizon can stimulate elderly’s labor force participation, as Staubli and
Zweimüller (2013) and Brunello and Comi (2013) show for Austria and Italy, respectively.
These policies should take into account our results. For example, individuals in sectors
with larger technical change seem to be more prone to take up training programs and
delay retirement. Therefore, training policies for the elderlymay bemore effective in these
sectors.24
We omit at least two potentially important determinants of the early retirement deci-
sion in our analysis due to data limitations. First, previous studies like Johnson and
Neumark (1997) find evidence of age discrimination in the work place in terms of both
career prospects and the likelihood of job separations. Self-reported age discrimination
may then be a relevant driver of the early retirement decision.25 See Neumark (2009) for
a review. Second, previous studies like Liebman and Luttmer (2012) have also assigned a
specific role to individual expectations over future pension benefits and the rest of income
components in shaping the labor supply of the elderly. We leave both extensions to future
research.
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In this paper we abstract from whether the retirement decision is voluntary or involun-
tary, although this aspect may be relevant for policy design. Dorn and Sousa-Poza (2010)
show that involuntary early retirement is more widespread in Continental Europe as it
depends also on employment protection legislation and not only on the generosity of
pension schemes. Eichhorst (2011) stresses the importance of incentives for both work-
ers and firms in the design of “active aging” reforms and explores the related political
economy mechanisms.
Endnotes
1Maestas and Zissimopoulos (2010) provides an extensive review.
2We adopt the RAND HRS elaboration of this data. The RAND HRS Data file is an
easy to use longitudinal data set based on the HRS data. It was developed at RAND with
funding from the National Institute on Aging and the Social Security Administration.
See RAND (2013). The original Health and Retirement Study public use database is
produced and distributed by the University of Michigan with funding from the National
Institute on Aging (grant number NIA U01AG09740). Ann Arbor, MI, (2014).
3In the data there is a negligible number of individuals that return back to the labor
force after having retired. We exclude them from the analysis.
4Individuals that repeat the survey over time may report different sectors as the one
with longest tenure. However, these individuals represent a negligible share of
observations. Nevertheless, we assign to each individual the sector with longest tenure
that is reported in the last available survey wave.
5The current sector may in fact reflect the process of exit from the work force, as
individuals are first pushed out of their sector of specialization and later out of the labor
force all together.
6We include a robustness exercise that considers only the individuals that do not
switch sectors in Section 3.
7We aggregate the ISIC-coded industries of KLEMS so as to be compatible with the
classification of the US Census Bureau adopted by the HRS. We report in Appendix C:
Table 21 the details on the industry correspondence.
8In order to smooth out business cycle effects, we use the average TFP across three
years, from the year before to the year after the entry into the labor market. We do the
same for the TFP levels around the year of the wave.
9The HRS data does not allow for a more disaggregated industry classification that
covers all the survey waves. A 19-sectors classification is available only from 2006 and
only for some individuals.
10We ignore individuals that are either disabled or not in the labor force (and yet not
retired), as they represent a negligible share of the population. We prefer to report the
2006 wave in order to avoid the crisis years, although the demographic and labor status
dynamics do not change in 2008 and 2010.
11For a discussion on perceived skill obsolescence and its relevance even in early stages
of individuals’ working life, see for example Cedefop (2012) and Sanders et al. (2015).
12See Moulton (1990).
13The negative values of bit for some of these observations are due to the drop in TFP
induced by the crisis in 2008–2010, which dominates only for those individuals that
enter the labor market in recent years.
14The interval 10%–360% supports 98% of the technical changes’ distribution, with
14.6% of the observations concentrated on the right of the 260% maximum.
15See Behaghel et al. (2014) for a recent quantitative evaluation of the impact of
disability insurance on early retirement behavior in France.
16See Jousten et al. (2014) for evidence health concerns’ role in the decision to exit the
labor market.
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17We also do not report sensitivity analyses that feature only linear effects and
different specifications of the set of dummies, as they deliver the same message as the
one reported in Appendix B: Table 4. These exercises are available upon request.
18Appendix C: Table 21 reports the sector correspondence across the different
classification schemes.
19The rest of the covariates do not change relevantly across the different specifications.
This detail is available upon request.
20We have this question for the waves in 1992 and 1994 only, so we assign the value 1
to the dummy “Training” to all individuals in all waves that answered positively to this
question in either the 1992 or the 1994 wave.
21For a detailed analysis of the determinants of training, see for example (OECD 1999,
Table 3.12.)
22These dynamics may well depend on the labor market institutions and retirement
schemes. Brunello and Langella (2013) show for example how increases in the minimum
retirement age in Europe lead to a higher likelihood of a gradual transition into
retirement. Euwals et al. (2012) analyze the effect of an institutional change on the
possible pathways to retirement in the Netherlands.
23Technical change may affect the participation in the labor force of the elderly not
only in the extensive margin but also in the intensive margin. The transition from
full-time to part-time job may only partially take this into account (hours worked pass
from an average of 46.6 h to an average of 29.7 h from the full-time to the part-time
subsamples), and looking at the actual hours worked may be more informative on this
margin. However, the unconditional correlation between hours worked and our measure
of technical change in the sample of individuals that still work is nil (0.2% with no
statistical significance).
24Policies that target early retirement should also take into account potential side
effects of a longer work life, like health deterioration, as Hallberg et al. (2014) point out.
25Adams (2002) uses a question contained in the first wave of the HRS about age
discrimination in job promotions, which only indirectly relates to early retirement
decisions.
Appendix
Appendix A: Figures
Fig. 1 US data from OECD (2013)
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Fig. 2 Technical change faced by individuals across sectors
Fig. 3 Technical change faced by individuals across waves
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Fig. 4 Technical change faced by individuals across years of entry (quartiles of the distribution)
Fig. 5 Technical change faced by individuals across birth cohorts (quartiles of the distribution)
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Fig. 6 Predicted probability of early retirement as a function of technical change based on the logit model of
column (1) in Appendix B: Table 3
Fig. 7 Fractional-polynomial prediction of hourly wage of working individuals as a function of technical
change
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Fig. 8 Predicted probability of early retirement, unemployment, and working part-time as a function of
technical change based on the logit models of column (1), column (2), and column (3) in Appendix B: Table 20
Appendix B: Tables
Table 1 Labor status by age group for 1992 and 2006
1992 (Wave 1) Age group
Labor status 50–54 55–59 60–64 Total
Working Full-Time 0.4014 0.3656 0.0804 0.8474
Working Part-Time 0.0286 0.0247 0.0047 0.0580
Unemployed 0.0144 0.0169 0.0032 0.0346
Retired 0.0135 0.0339 0.0127 0.0600
Total 0.4580 0.4412 0.1009 1
2006 (Wave 8) Age group
Labor status 50–54 55–59 60–64 Total
Working Full-Time 0.2439 0.3906 0.1812 0.8157
Working Part-Time 0.0142 0.0298 0.0149 0.0588
Unemployed 0.0080 0.0105 0.0032 0.0218
Retired 0.0085 0.0326 0.0627 0.1037
Total 0.2745 0.4635 0.2619 1
Notes: We use survey weights for each wave
Table 2 Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Retired (d) 0.120 0.325 0 1
TFP change 1.884 0.664 –0.468 4.086
Age 57.440 3.694 50 64
Years of education 12.923 3.201 0 17
Health level 2.464 1.049 1 5
Birth year 1941.4 6.051 1927 1960
Race: Black (d) 0.122 0.328 0 1
Race: Hispanic (d) 0.103 0.304 0 1
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Table 2 Summary statistics (Continued)
Foreign born (d) 0.109 0.312 0 1
Married (d) 0.828 0.377 0 1
Spouse working (d) 0.529 0.499 0 1
Private health insurance (d) 0.796 0.403 0 1
Government health insurance (d) 0.066 0.249 0 1
Net wealth (deflated, in $100,000s) 0.040 0.066 –0.045 2.548
Pension plan or pension income (d) 0.599 0.490 0 1
Sector experience 36.989 8.379 0 51
Training (d) 0.155 0.362 0 1
Residence: Midwest (d) 0.259 0.438 0 1
Residence: South (d) 0.402 0.490 0 1
Residence: West (d) 0.182 0.386 0 1
Occupation: Managers and professionals (d) 0.336 0.472 0 1
Occupation: Clerical and sales (d) 0.142 0.349 0 1
Occupation: Services (d) 0.066 0.249 0 1
Occupation: Farming, forestry, and fishing (d) 0.043 0.202 0 1
Occupation: Mechanics, constructors, operators (d) 0.395 0.489 0 1
Occupation: Armed forces (d) 0.019 0.136 0 1
Sector: Agriculture, forestry, fishing (d) 0.043 0.203 0 1
Sector: Mining and Construction (d) 0.109 0.312 0 1
Sector: Manufacturing Non-durable (d) 0.090 0.286 0 1
Sector: Manufacturing Durable (d) 0.168 0.374 0 1
Sector: Transportation (d) 0.105 0.307 0 1
Sector: Wholesale (d) 0.053 0.225 0 1
Sector: Retail (d) 0.081 0.272 0 1
Sector: Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (d) 0.049 0.215 0 1
Sector: Business and Repair Services (d) 0.055 0.228 0 1
Sector: Personal services (d) 0.017 0.129 0 1
Sector: Entertainment and recreation (d) 0.009 0.096 0 1
Sector: Professional and related services (d) 0.144 0.351 0 1
Sector: Public Administration (d) 0.077 0.267 0 1
TFP change (last 5 years) 0.134 0.125 –0.126 0.602
Mean TFP change 0.051 0.018 0.005 0.136
Mean aggregate TFP change 0.050 0.012 0.009 0.137
Mean sector-specific TFP change 0.001 0.013 –0.021 0.035
Value added per worker change 1.153 1.375 –0.48 6.591
Notes: All variables have 21,856 non-missing observations, except for the mean TFP changes that have 21,853 observations. Mean
TFP changes are winsorized at the 1-st and 99-th percentiles
Table 3 Benchmark regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. var.: Retired Logit OLS Random efx Fixed efx Survival
TFP growth 0.075*** 0.091*** 0.122*** 0.464*** 0.059***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.026) (0.097) (0.009)
TFP growth squared –0.015*** –0.019*** –0.029*** –0.033* –0.013***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.008) (0.017) (0.002)
Married (d) 0.009** 0.017*** 0.026*** 0.014 0.007*
(0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.004)
Spouse working (d) –0.042*** –0.057*** –0.065*** –0.106*** –0.037***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.004)
Emp. health ins. (d) –0.001 0.002 –0.038*** –0.092*** –0.000
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Table 3 Benchmark regressions (Continued)
(0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.021) (0.004)
Gov. health ins. (d) 0.127*** 0.185*** 0.175*** 0.195*** 0.103***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.028) (0.033) (0.010)
Wealth 0.062∗∗∗ 0.061∗ 0.073 0.258∗∗ 0.048∗∗
(0.023) (0.035) (0.070) (0.111) (0.020)
Pension (d) –0.079∗∗∗ –0.098∗∗∗ –0.159∗∗∗ –0.210∗∗∗ –0.070∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.011) (0.022) (0.022) (0.008)
Very good health (d) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.006 0.013∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Good health (d) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005)
Fair health (d) 0.076∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012) (0.009)
Poor health (d) 0.279∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.016) (0.015) (0.020) (0.024)
(Pseudo) R-squared (0.239) 0.191 0.183 0.558
Within 0.284
Between 0.162
Observations 21,856 21,856 21,856 21,856 21,856
Notes: All models except column (4) include race, foreign-born, geographical, education, occupation, age, cohort, and sector
dummies, as well as controls for the unemployment rate in the survey year and the sector experience. The symbol (d) indicates
discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. Statistical significance is represented by * for p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, and *** for
p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the sector-wave level (at the sector level in Model (3) with random effects and Model (4)
with fixed effects). Column (1) and column (5) report the marginal effects of logit and complementary log-log regressions. The
individual fixed effects of column (4) replace all time-invariant dummies and impose the exclusion of the age dummies because
of the collinearity with sector experience
Table 4 Robustness on different measures of technical change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. var.: Retired Benchmark 5-years Mean
growth
Mean Sect. &
Aggr.
VA/workers
TFP growth 0.075***
(0.010)
TFP growth squared –0.015***
(0.002)
TFP growth (last 5 years) 0.126
(0.078)
TFP growth (last 5 years) sq –0.186
(0.187)
Mean TFP growth 5.309***
(0.674)
Mean TFP growth sq –36.559***
(4.636)
Mean sector-specific TFP
growth
1.188**
(0.551)
Mean sector-specific TFP
growth sq
–12.756
(16.159)
Mean aggregate TFP growth 9.052***
(1.079)
Mean aggregate TFP growth sq –60.109***
(7.797)
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Table 4 Robustness on different measures of technical change (Continued)
VA per worker growth 0.034***
(0.010)
VA per worker growth sq –0.007***
(0.002)
Pseudo R-squared 0.239 0.238 0.244 0.249 0.238
Observations 21,856 21,856 21,853 21,853 21,856
Notes: All models have the same specification of column (1) in Table 3 except for the measure of technical change. Statistical
significance is represented by * for p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, and *** for p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the sector-wave
level. All models report the marginal effects of logit regressions. Column (3) and column (4) report 21,853 observations because
three observations correspond to a nil sector experience. Mean TFP changes are winsorized at the 1-st and 99-th percentiles
Table 5 Robustness on measures of technical change with exogenous entry
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var.: Retired Benchmark FE End of educ. 21 years old
TFP growth 0.464∗∗∗
(0.097)
TFP growth squared –0.033∗
(0.017)
TFP growth (from end of educ.) 0.529∗∗
(0.175)
TFP growth (from end of educ.) sq –0.048
(0.032)
TFP growth (from 21 yo) 0.711∗∗∗
(0.162)
TFP growth (from 21 yo) squared –0.090∗∗
(0.032)
Married 0.014 0.017 0.014
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011)
Spouse working –0.106∗∗∗ –0.107∗∗∗ –0.107∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Emp. health ins. –0.092∗∗∗ –0.091∗∗∗ –0.092∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Gov. health ins. 0.195∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.032) (0.033)
Wealth 0.258∗∗ 0.253∗∗ 0.261∗∗
(0.111) (0.112) (0.111)
Pension –0.210∗∗∗ –0.210∗∗∗ –0.210∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Very good health (d) 0.013∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Good health (d) 0.031∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
Fair health (d) 0.087∗∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Poor health (d) 0.258∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
R-squared 0.558 0.547 0.558
Observations 21,856 21,183 21,856
Notes: All models include individual fixed effects and geographical dummies, as well as controls for the unemployment rate in the
survey year and the sector experience. Statistical significance is represented by * for p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, and *** for p < 0.01.
Standard errors are clustered at the sector level. The lower number of observations in column (2) is due to a few individuals in our
sample that end their education before 1948, that is, before the year from which we are able to compute the TFP growth rates
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Table 6 Robustness on different-order polynomials
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var.: Retired Benchmark Linear Order 3
TFP growth 0.075∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.005) (0.023)
TFP growth squared –0.015∗∗∗ –0.026∗∗
(0.002) (0.013)
TFP growth cube 0.002
(0.002)
Married (d) 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Spouse working (d) –0.042∗∗∗ –0.042∗∗∗ –0.042∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Emp. health ins. (d) –0.001 –0.000 –0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Gov. health ins. (d) 0.127∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Wealth 0.062∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Pension (d) –0.079∗∗∗ –0.078∗∗∗ –0.079∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Very good health (d) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Good health (d) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Fair health (d) 0.076∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Poor health (d) 0.279∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Pseudo R-squared 0.239 0.237 0.239
Observations 21,856 21,856 21,856
Notes: All models include race, foreign-born, geographical, education, occupation, age, cohort, and sector dummies, as well as
controls for the unemployment rate in the survey year and the sector experience. Statistical significance is represented by * for
p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, and *** for p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the sector-wave level. All models report the
marginal effects of logit regressions
Table 7 Robustness on different subsamples
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var.: Retired Benchmark Only positive shocks W/o crisis years
TFP growth 0.075∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
TFP growth squared –0.015∗∗∗ –0.016∗∗∗ –0.014∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Married (d) 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Spouse working (d) –0.042∗∗∗ –0.042∗∗∗ –0.041∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Emp. health ins. (d) –0.001 –0.000 –0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Gov. health ins. (d) 0.127∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
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Table 7 Robustness on different subsamples (Continued)
Wealth 0.062∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.043∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026)
Pension (d) –0.079∗∗∗ –0.079∗∗∗ –0.075∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Very good health (d) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Good health (d) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Fair health (d) 0.076∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Poor health (d) 0.279∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.029)
Pseudo R-squared 0.239 0.239 0.242
Observations 21,856 21,757 19,373
Notes: All models include race, foreign-born, geographical, education, occupation, age, cohort, and sector dummies, as well as
controls for the unemployment rate in the survey year and the sector experience. Statistical significance is represented by * for
p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, and *** for p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the sector-wave level. All models report the
marginal effects of logit regressions. Column (2) has less observations due to unreported years of schooling
Table 8 Robustness on sector and occupation switchers
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var.: Retired Benchmark W/o sector switch W/o occup. switch
TFP growth 0.075∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.029) (0.015)
TFP growth squared –0.015∗∗∗ –0.036∗∗∗ –0.021∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
Married (d) 0.009∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Spouse working (d) –0.042∗∗∗ –0.043∗∗∗ –0.043∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Emp. health ins. (d) –0.001 –0.001 –0.000
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Gov. health ins. (d) 0.127∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Wealth 0.062∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.028) (0.028)
Pension (d) –0.079∗∗∗ –0.091∗∗∗ –0.092∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Very good health (d) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Good health (d) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Fair health (d) 0.076∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Poor health (d) 0.279∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.028)
Pseudo R-squared 0.239 0.254 0.249
Observations 21,856 19,404 19,638
Notes: All models include race, foreign-born, geographical, education, occupation, age, cohort, and sector dummies, as well as
controls for the unemployment rate in the survey year and the sector experience. Statistical significance is represented by * for
p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, and *** for p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the sector-wave level. All models report the
marginal effects of logit regressions
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Table 9 Additional robustness checks
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var.: Retired Benchmark Survey weights Winsorized
TFP growth 0.075∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.021)
TFP growth squared –0.015∗∗∗ –0.014∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.005)
Win. TFP growth 0.078∗∗∗
(0.010)
Win. TFP growth squared –0.015∗∗∗
(0.002)
Married (d) 0.009∗∗ 0.008 0.009∗∗
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
Spouse working (d) –0.042∗∗∗ –0.054∗∗∗ –0.042∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Emp. health ins. (d) –0.001 –0.005 –0.001
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Gov. health ins. (d) 0.127∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.019) (0.013)
Wealth 0.062∗∗∗ 0.039 0.062∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.049) (0.023)
Pension (d) –0.079∗∗∗ –0.086∗∗∗ –0.079∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Very good health (d) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.008 0.014∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.009) (0.005)
Good health (d) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.009) (0.005)
Fair health (d) 0.076∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.018) (0.010)
Poor health (d) 0.279∗∗∗ 0.309∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.044) (0.026)
Pseudo R-squared 0.239 0.239
Observations 21,856 13,539 21,856
Notes: All models include race, foreign-born, geographical, education, occupation, age, cohort, and sector dummies, as well as
controls for the unemployment rate in the survey year and the sector experience. Statistical significance is represented by * for
p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, and *** for p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the sector-wave level. All models report the
marginal effects of logit regressions
Table 10 Additional robustness checks
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var.: Retired Benchmark Year-by-year cohort Lagged controls
TFP growth 0.075∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.015)
TFP growth squared –0.015∗∗∗ –0.015∗∗∗ –0.015∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Married (d) 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗∗ –0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Spouse working (d) –0.042∗∗∗ –0.042∗∗∗ –0.027∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Emp. health ins. (d) –0.001 –0.001 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
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Table 10 Additional robustness checks (Continued)
Gov. health ins. (d) 0.127∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.016)
Wealth 0.062∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.043
(0.023) (0.024) (0.036)
Pension (d) –0.079∗∗∗ –0.079∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006)
Very good health (d) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Good health (d) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Fair health (d) 0.076∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014)
Poor health (d) 0.279∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.036)
Pseudo R-squared 0.239 0.241 0.153
Observations 21,856 21,826 15,693
Notes: All models include race, foreign-born, geographical, education, occupation, age, cohort, and sector dummies, as well as
controls for the unemployment rate in the survey year and the sector experience. Statistical significance is represented by * for
p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, and *** for p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the sector-wave level. All models report the
marginal effects of logit regressions. Column (2) includes year-by-year cohort dummies instead of 5 years-by-5 years cohort
dummies that we use in the benchmark regression. Column (3)’s time-varying covariates are all lagged by one period except for
TFP growth and the unemployment rate
Table 11 Heterogeneity by education level
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var.: Retired Benchmark College graduates Others
TFP growth 0.075∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.018) (0.013)
TFP growth squared –0.015∗∗∗ –0.014∗∗∗ –0.017∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Married (d) 0.009∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.009
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Spouse working (d) –0.042∗∗∗ –0.049∗∗∗ –0.040∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
Emp. health ins. (d) –0.001 0.002 –0.001
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006)
Gov. health ins. (d) 0.127∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.020) (0.016)
Wealth 0.062∗∗∗ 0.023 0.104∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.025) (0.037)
Pension (d) –0.079∗∗∗ –0.083∗∗∗ –0.077∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.012) (0.010)
Very good health (d) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Good health (d) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗
(0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
Fair health (d) 0.076∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.024) (0.011)
Poor health (d) 0.279∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.077) (0.028)
Pseudo R-squared 0.239 0.209 0.254
Observations 21,856 5,985 15,850
Notes: All models include race, foreign-born, geographical, education, occupation, age, cohort, and sector dummies, as well as
controls for the unemployment rate in the survey year and the sector experience. Statistical significance is represented by * for
p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, and *** for p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the sector-wave level. All models report the
marginal effects of logit regressions
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Table 12 Heterogeneity by occupation
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var.: Retired Benchmark Managers and professionals Others
TFP growth 0.075∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.024) (0.013)
TFP growth squared –0.015∗∗∗ –0.013∗∗∗ –0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Married (d) 0.009∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.007
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Spouse working (d) –0.042∗∗∗ –0.045∗∗∗ –0.035∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.013) (0.005)
Emp. health ins. (d) –0.001 0.009 –0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Gov. health ins. (d) 0.127∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.023) (0.016)
Wealth 0.062∗∗∗ 0.021 0.097∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.020) (0.035)
Pension (d) –0.079∗∗∗ –0.069∗∗∗ –0.076∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.020) (0.009)
Very good health (d) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.010
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Good health (d) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.011) (0.007)
Fair health (d) 0.076∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.023) (0.012)
Poor health (d) 0.279∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.072) (0.028)
Pseudo R-squared 0.239 0.216 0.260
Observations 21,856 7,310 14,519
Notes: All models include race, foreign-born, geographical, education, occupation, age, cohort, and sector dummies, as well as
controls for the unemployment rate in the survey year and the sector experience. Statistical significance is represented by * for
p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, and *** for p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the sector-wave level. All models report the
marginal effects of logit regressions
Table 13 Heterogeneity by sector
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep. var.: Retired Benchmark Manufactg. Prof. svcs. P.A. Rest
TFP growth 0.075∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.040∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.055) (0.024) (0.046) (0.015)
TFP growth squared –0.015∗∗∗ –0.036∗ –0.005 –0.033∗∗∗ –0.015∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.022) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006)
Married (d) 0.009∗∗ 0.017∗ 0.000 0.032∗∗ 0.005
(0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.014) (0.005)
Spouse working (d) –0.042∗∗∗ –0.052∗∗∗ –0.031∗∗∗ –0.068∗∗∗ –0.037∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.022) (0.004)
Emp. health ins. (d) –0.001 –0.014 0.000 0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.013) (0.007) (0.022) (0.006)
Gov. health ins. (d) 0.127∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗ 0.059 0.124∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.033) (0.017) (0.041) (0.015)
Wealth 0.062∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ –0.019 0.305∗ 0.038
(0.023) (0.072) (0.036) (0.160) (0.029)
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Table 13 Heterogeneity by sector (Continued)
Pension (d) –0.079∗∗∗ –0.137∗∗∗ –0.062∗∗∗ –0.311∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.023) (0.019) (0.046) (0.009)
Very good health (d) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.023∗ 0.011 –0.004 0.012∗
(0.005) (0.014) (0.008) (0.015) (0.006)
Good health (d) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.021 0.019∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.016) (0.008) (0.015) (0.007)
Fair health (d) 0.076∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗ 0.062∗ 0.075∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.024) (0.021) (0.034) (0.014)
Poor health (d) 0.279∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.052) (0.044) (0.097) (0.036)
Pseudo R-squared 0.239 0.273 0.167 0.280 0.253
Observations 21,856 5,612 3,034 1,685 11,389
Notes: All models include race, foreign-born, geographical, education, occupation, age, and cohort dummies, as well as controls
for the unemployment rate in the survey year and the sector experience. We leave sector dummies only in column (1), column
(2), and column (5). Statistical significance is represented by * for p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, and *** for p < 0.01. Standard errors
are clustered at the sector-wave level in column (1), column (2), and column (5), and at the wave level in column (3) and column
(4). All models report the marginal effects of logit regressions
Table 14 Heterogeneity by marital status
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var.: Retired Benchmark Married Unmarried
TFP growth 0.075∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.025)
TFP growth squared –0.015∗∗∗ –0.014∗∗∗ –0.019∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Married (d) 0.009∗∗
(0.004)
Spouse working (d) –0.042∗∗∗ –0.045∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Emp. health ins. (d) –0.001 0.010∗∗ –0.050∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.004) (0.013)
Gov. health ins. (d) 0.127∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.016) (0.023)
Wealth 0.062∗∗∗ 0.040 0.138∗∗
(0.023) (0.026) (0.068)
Pension (d) –0.079∗∗∗ –0.083∗∗∗ –0.059∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
Very good health (d) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.040∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.020)
Good health (d) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.022)
Fair health (d) 0.076∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.034)
Poor health (d) 0.279∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.030) (0.062)
Pseudo R-squared 0.239 0.240 0.262
Observations 21,856 18,094 3,762
Notes: All models include race, foreign-born, geographical, education, occupation, age, cohort, and sector dummies, as well as
controls for the unemployment rate in the survey year and the sector experience. Statistical significance is represented by * for
p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, and *** for p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the sector-wave level. All models report the
marginal effects of logit regressions
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Table 15 Heterogeneity by cohort
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var.: Retired Benchmark Pre-war cohort Post-war cohort
TFP growth 0.075∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.018) (0.011)
TFP growth squared –0.015∗∗∗ –0.018∗∗∗ –0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Married (d) 0.009∗∗ 0.006 0.012∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004)
Spouse working (d) –0.042∗∗∗ –0.053∗∗∗ –0.033∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Emp. health ins. (d) –0.001 –0.008 0.005
(0.005) (0.010) (0.005)
Gov. health ins. (d) 0.127∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.019) (0.017)
Wealth 0.062∗∗∗ 0.037 0.059∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.040) (0.018)
Pension (d) –0.079∗∗∗ –0.093∗∗∗ –0.067∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.017) (0.006)
Very good health (d) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.011 0.019∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006)
Good health (d) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.008) (0.007)
Fair health (d) 0.076∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.014) (0.013)
Poor health (d) 0.279∗∗∗ 0.325∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.041) (0.035)
Pseudo R-squared 0.239 0.229 0.240
Observations 21,856 11,088 10,768
Notes: All models include race, foreign-born, geographical, education, occupation, age, cohort, and sector dummies, as well as
controls for the unemployment rate in the survey year and the sector experience. Statistical significance is represented by * for
p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, and *** for p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the sector-wave level. All models report the
marginal effects of logit regressions
Table 16 Heterogeneity by age group
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var.: Retired Benchmark Age 50–54 Age 55–59 Age 60–64
TFP growth 0.075∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.008) (0.013) (0.033)
TFP growth squared –0.015∗∗∗ –0.004∗ –0.012∗∗∗ –0.029∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.008)
Married (d) 0.009∗∗ 0.002 0.012∗∗ 0.013
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.013)
Spouse working (d) –0.042∗∗∗ –0.006∗∗ –0.032∗∗∗ –0.107∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.010)
Emp. health ins. (d) -0.001 0.002 0.011∗∗ –0.028∗
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.016)
Gov. health ins. (d) 0.127∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.018) (0.023) (0.026)
Wealth 0.062∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ -0.054
(0.023) (0.008) (0.031) (0.074)
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Table 16 Heterogeneity by age group (Continued)
Pension (d) –0.079∗∗∗ –0.034∗∗∗ –0.082∗∗∗ –0.130∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.006) (0.011) (0.016)
Very good health (d) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.009∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.025∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.015)
Good health (d) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.009∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.015)
Fair health (d) 0.076∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.018) (0.012) (0.023)
Poor health (d) 0.279∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.047) (0.036) (0.045)
Pseudo R-squared 0.239 0.272 0.179 0.171
Observations 21,856 5,304 9,528 7,014
Notes: All models include race, foreign-born, geographical, education, occupation, age, cohort, and sector dummies, as well as
controls for the unemployment rate in the survey year and the sector experience. Statistical significance is represented by * for
p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, and *** for p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the sector-wave level. All models report the
marginal effects of logit regressions
Table 17 Heterogeneity by gender
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var.: Retired Benchmark Only females Both genders
TFP growth 0.075∗∗∗ 0.012 0.029∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008)
TFP growth squared –0.015∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ –0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male (d) –0.036∗∗∗
(0.004)
Married (d) 0.009∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) ((0.003)
Spouse working (d) –0.042∗∗∗ –0.062∗∗∗ –0.054∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Emp. health ins. (d) –0.001 –0.018∗∗∗ –0.011∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Gov. health ins. (d) 0.127∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.010)
Wealth 0.062∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.045) (0.032)
Pension (d) –0.079∗∗∗ –0.200∗∗∗ –0.157∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
Very good health (d) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.006 0.012∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) ((0.004)
Good health (d) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Fair health (d) 0.076∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.008)
Poor health (d) 0.279∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.023) (0.016)
Pseudo R-squared 0.239 0.246 0.232
Observations 21,856 24,859 46,715
Notes: All models include race, foreign-born, geographical, education, occupation, age, cohort, and sector dummies, as well as
controls for the unemployment rate in the survey year and the sector experience. Statistical significance is represented by * for
p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, and *** for p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the sector-wave level. All models report the
marginal effects of logit regressions
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Table 18 Heterogeneity by sector experience
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep. var.: Retired Benchmark Quartiles Short exp. Long exp.
TFP growth 0.075*** 0.050*** 0.026*** 0.097***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.034)
TFP growth squared –0.015*** –0.009*** –0.004 –0.012**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
Sector experience –0.001***
(0.000)
Sect. exp. 2nd q (d) 0.015** 0.010***
(0.006) (0.004)
Sect. exp. 3rd q (d) –0.008
(0.006)
Sect. exp. 4th q (d) –0.031*** –0.055***
(0.006) (0.009)
Married (d) 0.009** 0.010*** 0.005 0.016**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Spouse working (d) –0.042*** –0.041*** –0.022*** –0.064***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Emp. health ins. (d) –0.001 –0.001 –0.003 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009)
Gov. health ins. (d) 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.122*** 0.131***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.019)
Wealth 0.062*** 0.054** 0.047** 0.053
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.043)
Pension (d) –0.079*** –0.078*** –0.063*** –0.097***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Bad health 2/5 (d) 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.011
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009)
Bad health 3/5 (d) 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.026***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Bad health 4/5 (d) 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.086*** 0.067***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013)
Bad health 5/5 (d) 0.279*** 0.276*** 0.290*** 0.262***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.036) (0.038)
Pseudo R-squared 0.239 0.244 0.270 0.220
Observations 21856 21856 10925 10684
Notes: All models include race, foreign-born, geographical, education, occupation, age, cohort, and sector dummies, as well as a
control for the unemployment rate in the survey year. Statistical significance is represented by * for p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, and
*** for p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the sector-wave level. All models report the marginal effects of logit regressions
Table 19 Heterogeneity by training
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var.: Retired Benchmark With training W/o training
TFP growth 0.075∗∗∗ 0.044 0.078∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.041) (0.009)
TFP growth squared –0.015∗∗∗ –0.005 –0.016∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.008) (0.002)
Married (d) 0.009∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.007∗
(0.004) (0.011) (0.004)
Spouse working (d) –0.042∗∗∗ –0.047∗∗∗ –0.041∗∗∗
Burlon and Vilalta-Bufí IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2016) 5:5 Page 36 of 39
Table 19 Heterogeneity by training (Continued)
(0.004) (0.011) (0.004)
Emp. health ins. (d) –0.001 0.006 –0.002
(0.005) (0.014) (0.005)
Gov. health ins. (d) 0.127∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.035) (0.013)
Wealth 0.062∗∗∗ 0.080 0.056∗∗
(0.023) (0.077) (0.023)
Pension (d) –0.079∗∗∗ –0.097∗∗∗ –0.077∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.021) (0.008)
Very good health (d) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.007 0.015∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.015) (0.005)
Good health (d) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.021 0.027∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.016) (0.006)
Fair health (d) 0.076∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.027) (0.011)
Poor health (d) 0.279∗∗∗ 0.440∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.077) (0.026)
Pseudo R-squared 0.239 0.276 0.235
Observations 21,856 3,390 18,462
Notes: All models include race, foreign-born, geographical, education, occupation, age, cohort, and sector dummies, as well as
controls for the unemployment rate in the survey year and the sector experience. Statistical significance is represented by * for
p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, and *** for p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the sector-wave level. All models report the
marginal effects of logit regressions
Table 20 Effect of technical change on different labor statuses
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. var.: Retired Retired/Unemp. Retired/Unemp./Part-time
TFP growth 0.075∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.016)
TFP growth squared -0.015∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Married (d) 0.009∗∗ 0.009∗ 0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Spouse working (d) -0.042∗∗∗ -0.050∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Emp. health ins. (d) -0.001 -0.023∗∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.010)
Gov. health ins. (d) 0.127∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.014) (0.018)
Wealth 0.062∗∗∗ -0.013 0.078∗
(0.023) (0.032) (0.041)
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Table 20 Effect of technical change on different labor statuses (Continued)
Pension (d) -0.079∗∗∗ -0.138∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.011) (0.013)
Very good health (d) 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.008
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
Good health (d) 0.026∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Fair health (d) 0.076∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
Poor health (d) 0.279∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.025) (0.024)
Pseudo R-squared 0.239 0.214 0.175
Observations 21,856 21,856 21,856
Notes: All models include race, foreign-born, geographical, education, occupation, age, cohort, and sector dummies, as well as
controls for the unemployment rate in the survey year and the sector experience. Statistical significance is represented by * for
p < 0.10, ** for p < 0.05, and *** for p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the sector-wave level. All models report the
marginal effects of logit regressions
Appendix C: Data
We construct the correspondence between HRS and KLEMS industries.26 We map the
13-industries Census 2002 classification scheme used in the HRS into the 31 ISIC (rev 3)
codes used for the KLEMS data. This permits us to merge HRS’s individual data with
KLEMS’s sector data. We report the correspondences in column (1) of Table 21. We com-
pute analogous measures of value added per worker using BEA data. We follow Nolte
et al. (2013) to construct the correspondence between US Census industries and NAICS
codes. Column (2) of Table 21 indicates the correspondence across Census codes and
NAICS industries.
Table 21 Correspondence across classification schemes
(1) (2)
HRS industries KLEMS industries BEA industries
(Census 2002 codes) (31 ISIC rev 3) (NAICS 2002 codes)
01.Agric/Forest/Fish A, B 11
02.Mining and Constr C, F 21, 23
03.Mnfg: Non-durable D15–D25 31, 32 (exc. 321 and 327)
04.Mnfg: Durable D26–D37 33, 321, 327
05.Transportation E, I60–I64 22, 48, 49 (exc. 491), 51
06.Wholesale G50–G51 42
07.Retail G52 44, 45
08.Finance, Ins, and RE J, K70 52, 53
09.Busns/Repair Svcs K71–K74 54, 55, 56
10.Personal Services H 72, 81
11.Entertn/Recreatn O 71
12.Prof/Related Svcs M, N 6
13.Public Administr L NA, 491
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